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INTRODUCTION
When hunted, the ostrich is said to run a certain distance and then
thrust its head into the sand, thinking, because it cannot see, that it
cannot be seen by the hunters.1 Legal parlance therefore refers to the
"ostrich instruction," used when a defendant acts with the awareness
of a high probability of the existence of an incriminating fact, but re
mains deliberately ignorant as to whether the fact actually exists,
hoping his ignorance will maintain his innocence.2 The defendant is
like the ostrich - he thinks that if he does not actually see the facts,
even though he knows they are there, he will maintain his innocence.
1.

E.

COBHAM BREWER, DICTIONARY OF PHRASE AND FABLE (1898).

2. See Spurr v. United States, 174 U.S. 728 (1899). In Spurr, the defendant was charged
with knowingly certifying some checks drawn on a bank that was unable to cover them. The
Court said: "And so evil design may be presumed if the officer purposely keeps himself in
ignorance of whether the drawer has money in the bank or not, or is grossly indifferent to his
duty in respect to the ascertainment of that fact." Id. at 735.
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The ostrich instruction allows the jury to equate deliberate igno
rance3 with knowledge of a particular fact for the purpose of estab
lishing the requisite mens rea for a crime, particularly in the context of
conspiracy cases.4 Mens Rea is defined as "[a]n element of a criminal
responsibility: a guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful purpose; a criminal
intent. Guilty Knowledge and wilfulness."5 A person's criminal culpa
bility requires a showing that he acted purposely, knowingly, reck
lessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each ma
terial element of the offense.
The Model Penal Code says a person acts purposely with respect
to an element of a crime:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result
thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of
that nature or to cause such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware
of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or
hopes that they exist.6
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an
offense:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the atten
dant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that
nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that
it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a re
sult.7
A person acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result
from his conduct.8 A person acts negligently when he should be aware
of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists
or will result from his conduct.9
In Spurr v. United States1°, the Supreme Court said that to act with
deliberate ignorance is to act with the awareness of a high probability
of the existence of the fact in question. The Court said that the jury
3. Other terms for "deliberate ignorance" include "conscious avoidance" and "willful
blindness."
4. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (1985). In adopting this approach, the Model Penal
Code followed a common law tradition of equating deliberate avoidance of knowledge with
actual knowledge. See Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate Ignorance as a
Criminal Mens Rea, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 191, 196-203 (1990).
5. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 985 (6th ed. 1990).
6. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a).
7. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b).
8. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c).
9. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d).
10. 174 U.S. 728 (1899).
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may infer knowledge of a certain fact if the defendant intentionally
keeps himself in the dark about that fact.11In1969, the Supreme Court
formally adopted a variation of the definition of knowledge based on
deliberate ignorance in Leary v. United States.12 By 1970, many courts
had followed this lead and acknowledged the validity of equating de
liberate ignorance with guilty knowledge.13 Whether deliberate igno
rance can satisfy the mens rea of knowledge, and if so, when the use of
deliberate ignorance is appropriate in conspiracy cases is a hotly de
bated topic.14
The Supreme Court has approved of and been guided by the
Model Penal Code's definitions of knowledge and deliberate igno
rance, despite the fact that the Model Penal Code is not considered
binding authority. The Model Penal Code says that "[w]hen knowl
edge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense,
such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability
of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist. "15 In
Leary, the Court formally approved the Model Penal Code's defini
tion of knowledge. Subsequently, each of the federal circuits has
adopted this definition,16 indicating the general reliance on the Model
Penal Code as a source of authority.
Model Penal Code commentaries of section 2.02 provide that a
prosecutor can establish the defendant's knowledge of the existence of
particular fact without establishing positive knowledge17 if the prose
cutor can establish that the defendant is aware of a high probability of
its existence, without the defendant's believing that it actually does not
exist.18 The Commentaries explain that the subsection of the Model
1 1 . Spurr, 174 U.S. at 735 ("[A]n evil design may be presumed if the officer purposely
keeps himself in ignorance of whether the drawer has money in the bank or not.").
12. 395 U.S. 6 (1969). In Leary, the defendant appealed his conviction for knowingly
transporting illegally imported marijuana. He claimed the statute included an unconstitu
tional presumption he knew marijuana was imported. The Court employed the Model Penal
Code section 2.02(7)'s definition of knowledge to invalidate the presumption that the defen
dant knew the marijuana was imported.
13. See Robbins, supra note 4, at 203.
14. See, e.g., id. (arguing that the Model Penal Code's definitional scheme of levels of
culpability leads to the conclusion that deliberate ignorance substitutes recklessness, not
knowledge); Jonathan L. Marcus, Note, Model Penal Code 2.02(7) and Willful Blindness, 102
YALE L.J. 2231 (1993) (arguing that courts such as the Second Circuit that use deliberate
ignorance as a substitute for knowledge in limited circumstances have interpreted the defini
tion of deliberate ignorance too loosely).
15. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.02(7) (1985).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v.
Restrepo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Olivares-Vega, 495 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1974).
17. Positive knowledge is contrasted with imputed or inferred knowledge of a fact.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY. 873 (6th ed. 1990).
18. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.02(2)(b)(i), 2.02(7) (Official Draft, review and commen
taries); see also Douglas N. Husak & Craig A. Callender, Wilful Ignorance, Knowledge & the
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Penal Code's definition of knowledge is designed to deal with the
phenomenon of deliberate ignorance where a defendant is aware of
the probable existence of a material fact, but chooses not to determine
whether it exists or not.19
The Ninth Circuit first gave deliberate ignorance extensive treat
ment in United States v. Jewell.20 In Jewell, neither party contested the
fact that the appellant entered the United States driving an automo
bile in which 110 pounds of marijuana worth $6,250 had been con
cealed in a secret compartment between the trunk and rear seat.21 The
issue was whether the appellant possessed the requisite mens rea to be
convicted.22 There was circumstantial evidence from which the jury
could infer that the appellant had positive knowledge of the presence
of the marijuana, and that his testimony to the contrary was false.23 On
the other hand, there was evidence from which the jury could con
clude that the appellant was truthful when he said that although he
knew of the secret compartment and knew of facts indicating it con
tained marijuana, he deliberately avoided positive knowledge of the
presence of the contraband to avoid responsibility in the event of dis
covery.24 If the jury concluded the latter was indeed the situation, and
if positive knowledge was required to convict, the jury had no choice
but to find appellant not guilty even though he deliberately contrived
his lack of positive knowledge.25
In Jewell, the Ninth Circuit allowed a deliberate ignorance instruc
tion. The court concluded that the government may fulfill its burden
of proof by proving that if the defendant was not actually aware that
there was marijuana in the vehicle he was driving, his ignorance in that
regard was solely a result of his conscious decision to avoid the truth.26
"Equal Culpability" Thesis: A Study of the Deeper Significance of the Principle of Legality,
1994 WIS. L.REV. 29, 36.

19. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2)(b)(i), 2.02(7) (Official Draft, review and commentaries).
20. See 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976) (en bane); Marcus, supra note 14, at 2232.
21. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 698.
22. The appellant, convicted of violating the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act of 1970, testified that he did not know the marijuana was present, explain
ing that he had been paid $100 by a stranger to drive the car into the country, and that he
was not actually aware that it contained contraband. See Jewell, 532 F.2d at 699 n.l.
23. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 698-99.
24. Id. at 699.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 700. The Ninth Circuit found firm support for this instruction in the work of
legal commentators, such as Professor Rollin M. Perkins, who wrote:
One with a deliberate antisocial purpose in mind...may deliberately 'shut his eyes' toavoid
knowing what would otherwise be obvious to view. In such cases, so far as criminal law is
concerned, the person acts at his peril in this regard and is treated as having 'knowledge' of
the facts as they are ultimately discovered to be.
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The case provided one of the most comprehensive discussions of de
liberate ignorance in the history of the circuit courts' dealing with the
topic.27 The Jewell court justified its allowance of a deliberate igno
rance instruction by arguing that one who is deliberately ignorant is as
culpable as one who possesses positive knowledge, and that acting
knowingly necessarily includes acting with an awareness of the high
probability of the existence of the fact in question.28
The relationship between deliberate ignorance and the mens rea
requirements of a conspiracy charge became a source of confusion and
disagreement among lower courts. Following Jewell, courts took vari
ous approaches to the application of the deliberate ignorance instruc
tion and accompanying evidentiary requirements in conspiracy cases.29
As confusion mounted, many critics and courts turned to the Model
Penal Code and its mens rea requirements for guidance.30 Most com
mentators agree that the mens rea for conspiracy is purpose, or a spe
cific desire to further the criminal enterprise.31 No federal statute ex
plicitly prescribes a mens rea for conspiracy. The Supreme Court has
consistently held that, based on the Model Penal Code, the appropri
ate mens rea is intent to further the aims of the conspiracy.32 Accord
ing to the Model Penal Code, a person is guilty of conspiracy if, with
the purpose of promoting the commission of a crime, he agrees with
another person to engage in such conduct as constitutes a crime, or
agrees to help another person plan or commit a crime.33
Id. (citing R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 776 (2d ed. 1968)).

27. See Robbins, supra note 4, at 203.
28. See id. at 204-05.
29. For instance, while the Second and Ninth Circuits both apply similar evidentiary re
quirements for permitting a deliberate ignorance instruction, the Ninth Circuit maintains
that the deliberate ignorance doctrine should be used only rarely, where the Second Circuit
uses it more freely.
Other circuits have employed deliberate ignorance doctrines without reference to sec
tion 2.02(7) of the Model Penal Code. For instance, the Tenth Circuit rejected including sec
tion 2.02(7) as part of its deliberate ignorance instruction and has developed evidentiary
standards for a finding of deliberate ignorance that differ from those of the Second and
Ninth Circuit. See Marcus, supra note 14, at 2232.
30. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1985).
31. See, e.g. , Christine L. Chinni, Criminal Law - Whose Head ls in the Sand? Problems
with the Use of the Ostrich Instruction in Conspiracy Cases, 13 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 35, 41
(1991) (citing Fridman, Mens Rea in Conspiracy, 19 Moo. L. REV. 276 (1956)); Albert J.
Hamo, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 624 (1941)).
32. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); see also Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494 (1951); Fridman, supra note 31.
33. The Model Penal Code states:
A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the
purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he: (a) agrees with such other person or
persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct that constitutes such crime
or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or (b) agrees to aid such other person or
persons in the planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to com
mit such crime.
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The prosecution must meet two burdens in a conspiracy case. First,
it must establish that the defendant knew of the unlawful goals of the
conspiracy. Second, it must establish that the defendant had the pur
pose or intent to further its goals, and thus intended to be member of
the conspiracy.34 The Model Penal Code equates intent with purpose.35
Because most federal courts allow the ostrich instruction in conspiracy
cases to prove the first element,36 commentators have raised concerns
that confused juries could parlay deliberate ignorance into the second
element and convict the defendant on a lesser mens rea.37 They worry
that juries will convict the defendant on a finding of knowledge rather
than purpose.
Courts have taken varying approaches to this problem, some much
more liberal than others. One approach is to allow the prosecution to
use deliberate ignorance to establish the defendant's knowledge of the
unlawful goals of the conspiracy, but not to establish that the defen
dant intended to further the goals of the conspiracy. Courts using this
approach argue that the element of intent to further the goals of a
conspiracy requires specific intent, and thus requires proof of purpose,
as well as knowledge.38 Because deliberate ignorance is sufficient only
as to knowledge, these courts reason that deliberate ignorance is insuf
ficient to establish this latter element of conspiracy. In Ferranini,39 the
appellants challenged jury instructions explaining the applicability of
conscious avoidance to a conspiracy charge. The court had instructed
the jury that
they could find a defendant to have known a particular fact if the evi
dence showed "beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant. .. was
aware that there was a high probability of a fact, but deliberately and
consciously avoided confirming this fact." The court also instructed the
jury...that, as to the conspiracy count, it could find a defendant to have

MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03.
34. For instance, if someone gives the defendant a package of cocaine, and if the defen
dant agrees to take the package across the border of the United States and Mexico for a
large sum of cash, then it is clear that the defendant intended to further the goals of the con
spiracy (smuggling cocaine across the border) as evidenced by his commission of the overt
act (traveling across the border with the package).
35. MODEL PENAL CODE § l.13(12).
36. See United States v. Ferrarini, 219 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Inv. En
ters., Inc., 10 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 1993).
37. See Chinni, supra note 31, at 41-42 (explaining that the drafters of the Model Penal
Code noted a meaningful difference between knowledge and purpose: "Knowledge that the
requisite external circumstances exist is a common element in both conceptions. But action
is not purposive with respect to the nature or result of the actor's conduct unless it was his
conscious object to perform an action of that nature or to cause such a result."); see also
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 commentary at 223.
38. See Ferrarini, 219 F.3d 145. This Note will refer to this approach as the "strict com
pliance" approach.
39. Id.
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known of the unlawful object of the conspiracy - a requisite finding to
sustain a conspiracy conviction - if it found the defendant to have "de
liberately closed his eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious."40

The circuit court found that the lower court's instructions were ap
propriate because they permitted the jury to consider conscious avoid
ance to support a finding with respect of knowledge of the conspir
acy's unlawful goals, but did not permit the jury to consider conscious
avoidance to support a finding of the defendant's knowing participa
tion or membership in the conspiracy.41 Consequently, the Second Cir
cuit promotes a strict compliance approach in applying the deliberate
ignorance instruction. The instruction is only appropriate when the
prosecutor offers evidence of deliberate ignorance to show knowledge,
but not purpose.
Supporters of an alternate approach, however, argue that if the
prosecution can establish that the defendant knew of the unlawful
purpose of the conspiracy by proving deliberate ignorance, it follows
that the defendant must have intended to further the conspiracy's
purpose because he participated in the conspiracy.42 For instance, in
United States. v. Investment Enterprises, Inc.,43 the defendant was
charged with conspiracy to ship obscene videos interstate. The Fifth
Circuit ruled that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to infer that
the defendant knew of the unlawful aims of the conspiracy. His par
ticipation was evidence of his intent to further its purpose. In other
words, this approach allows the jury to connect logically the two ele
ments of conspiracy. This "logic approach " permits the jury to use
proof of deliberate ignorance to establish both knowledge of the un
lawful aims of a conspiracy and intent to further the goals of the con
spiracy: If the defendant knew of the unlawful goals of the conspiracy,
it follows that he intended to further the goals of the conspiracy as
evidenced by his action.
A third approach, taken by the Tenth Circuit, is perhaps the most
conservative of the three. Courts adopting this approach assert that a
"deliberate ignorance" instruction is appropriate in conspiracy cases
only when a defendant denies knowledge of a relevant fact, and when
the evidence shows that the defendant engaged in deliberate acts to
avoid knowledge of that operant fact.44 In other words, the court may
40. Id. at 154.
41. See id.
42. This Note will refer to this approach, adopted by the Fifth Circuit, as the "logic" ap
proach.
43. 10 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 1993).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Delreal-Ordones, 213 F.2d 1405 (10th Cir. 2000). In this
case, the defendant was prosecuted for possession with the intent to distribute methamphet
amine. An agent noticed that the defendant had purchased a one-way ticket on a train from
California to Kansas with cash, and observed the defendant with a black suitcase in the stor
age compartment. Upon being asked by the agent if his luggage could be searched, defen-
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tender a deliberate ignorance instruction only when the government
presents evidence that the defendant took deliberate and unequivocal
acts to avoid knowledge in order to have a defense in the event of
prosecution. The purpose of the instruction is to alert the jury that the
act of avoidance could be motivated by sufficient guilty knowledge to
satisfy the knowing element.45
This Note argues that the presently used approaches to a deliber
ate ignorance instruction in conspiracy cases are unsatisfactory. It fur
ther proposes an approach that allows the jury to use deliberate igno
rance to establish purpose if there is evidence that the defendant has
taken deliberate steps to avoid knowledge. Part I argues that deliber
ate ignorance is an appropriate substitute for knowledge. It also ad
dresses concerns that juries will confuse deliberate ignorance with
negligence or recklessness and thus convict on an inappropriate mens
rea. Part II examines the Second Circuit's strict compliance approach
and the Fifth Circuit's logic approach and concludes that neither is
satisfactory. It asserts that the strict compliance approach is too strict
in its allowance of the use of deliberate ignorance in conspiracy cases.
Part II further argues that the logic approach is inadequate because it
overlooks the mens rea requirements of conspiracy and the corre
spondence principle.46 Part III proposes an alternate approach which is
a variation of the Tenth Circuit's approach, by which the prosecution
may use deliberate ignorance to establish purpose in conspiracy cases
,if the defendant has taken deliberate acts to avoid knowledge of his
membership in a conspiracy. This Note concludes that this hybrid ap
proach is the best way for the courts to consider deliberate ignorance
in conspiracy cases because it does not confuse knowledge with reck
lessness and it requires unequivocal acts to prove deliberate igno
rance.

dant agreed and the agent discovered bundles of methamphetamine in a detergent box. De
fendant said he did not know how the drugs got into his suitcase, but that his friends had
packed his suitcase for him and must have included the box of detergent. Prosecutors argued
that the defendant must have known the drugs were in the box because when the defendant
discovered on his train ride that detergent had been leaking on him, rather than throwing
away the box, he simply cleaned it up. See also Marcus, supra note 14, at 2250.
45. See, e.g. , Delreal-Ordones v. United States, 531 U.S. 915 (2000).
46. The correspondence principle is the principle of criminal law which states that each
element of a crime has a corresponding mens rea (purpose, knowledge, recklessness or neg
ligence) that the prosecution must prove to establish the defendant's guilt. See Kenneth W.
Simons, When Is Strict Liability lust?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 1075, 1087 (1997);
Jeremy Horder, A Critique of the Correspondence Principle in Criminal Law, 1995 CRIM. L.
REV. 759. The Fifth Circuit's approach ignores this principle by allowing deliberate igno
rance (knowledge) to establish part I and thus part II of a conspiracy charge, whereas the
statute requires more than knowledge (purpose) to establish this second part.
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND DELIBERATE
IGNORANCE

Generally, courts and commentators agree that the mental state of
deliberate ignorance is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of knowl
edge.47 But there are also several vocal opponents of this proposition.
Whether and under what circumstances defendants with this mental
state should be held liable for acting knowingly constitutes "the prob
lem of willful ignorance. " 48 Section I.A argues that deliberate igno
rance is an appropriate substitute for knowledge as a mens rea in the
crime of conspiracy. Section I.B refutes oft-raised concerns that the
jury will mistake deliberate ignorance for negligence, thus convicting a
defendant on a lesser mens rea than that which is required by statute.
A.

Deliberate Ignorance as a Substitute for Knowledge

This Section attempts to trace the origin of the concept of deliber
ate ignorance, and to explain how it sprung from the definition of
knowledge. Next, this section explains the importance of equating de
liberate ignorance with knowledge in conspiracy cases. Finally, this
section refutes some of the concerns commentators have raised about
equating deliberate ignorance with knowledge.
In Jewell, the Ninth Circuit called the mental state possessed by the
defendant willful ignorance.49 In that case, there was circumstantial
evidence from which the jury could infer that the appellant had posi
tive knowledge of the presence of the marijuana. There was also evi
dence from which the jury could conclude that the appellant was truth
ful when he said that although the appellant knew of the secret
compartment and had knowledge of facts indicating it contained
marijuana, he deliberately avoided positive knowledge of the presence
of the contraband to avoid responsibility in the event of discovery.50 If
the jury concluded the latter was indeed the situation, and if the law
required positive knowledge for a conviction, the jury had no choice
but to find the appellant not guilty even though he deliberately con
trived his lack of positive knowledge.51
With their definition of knowledge, the drafters of the Model Pe
nal Code sought to develop a concept of knowledge that 'enables

47. E.g., Husak & Callender, supra note 18, at 33-34 (1994) (proposing in general that
the mental state found in Jewell is either a kind of knowledge or the moral equivalent of
knowledge, and as such, it is plausible to hold such a defendant liable for violating a statute
that requires that he act knowingly).
48. Id. at 34.
49. United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976) (en bane).
50. See Jewell, 532 F.2d at 699.
51. See id.
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courts to convict defendants for acting deliberately ignorant.52 The
Model Penal Code states that a person acts knowingly with respect to
a material element of an offense when, if the element involves the na
ture of his conduct or attendant circumstances, "he is aware that his
conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist. "53 The
Model Penal Code goes on to explain that the requirement of knowl
edge can be satisfied by a something less than knowledge with cer
tainty: "When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an
element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is
aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes
that it does not exist. "54
The courts created the concept of deliberate ignorance to describe
the culpable mental state found in cases like Jewell. The objective of
the courts is to convict a defendant who may lack genuine knowledge
and otherwise might be acquitted for acting knowingly, primarily be
cause morally he is as culpable as someone who acted with actual
knowledge.55 Courts accomplish this by describing a mental state that
is not a kind of knowledge, but can plausibly be construed as the
moral equivalent of knowledge - willful ignorance.56 The Jewell court
explained the broad definition of knowledge the Model Penal Code
provides by explaining that knowledge cannot be limited to positive
knowledge because such an interpretation would make deliberate ig
norance a defense.57
Although the Supreme Court has approved the Model Penal
Code's definition of deliberate ignorance, this definition is too vague.
The primary problem is the confusion between whether the Model
Penal Code treats the willfully ignorant defendant as possessing
genuine knowledge, or a substitute for knowledge.58 It seems relatively

52. See Husak & Callender, supra note 18, at 36.
53. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b)(i) (1985).
54. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7).
55. But see Robin Charlow, Wilful Ignorance and Criminal Culpability, 70 TEXAS L.
REV. 1351 (1992) (disagreeing with this proposition). Charlow argues that a person who is
certain that his conduct is criminal is more culpable than one who is only aware with a high
probability that that is the case. In sum, she claims that the certain actor is more dangerous
because he is less deterrable insofar as he has shown his willingness to violate the Jaw. Sec
ondly, she points out that the certain actor is more callous in his disregard for the law.
56. See Husak & Callender, supra note 18, at 36.
57. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 700. The Ninth Circuit explained that the substantive justification
for the [deliberate ignorance] rule is that deliberate ignorance and positive knowledge are
equally culpable. The textual justification is that in common understanding one "knows" a
fact of which he is less than absolutely certain. To act "knowingly" therefore, is not neces
sarily to act only with positive knowledge, but also to act with awareness of the high prob
ability of the existence of the fact in question. When such awareness is present, "positive"
knowledge is not required.
58. See Husak & Callender, supra note 18, at 43. Husak and Callender contrast the two
views about the relationship between willful ignorance and knowledge: that is, whether will-
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clear that deliberate ignorance is not genuine knowledge, otherwise it
would be unnecessary to distinguish the concept of deliberate igno
rance. The jury instructions in Jewell predicated liability on a particu
lar explanation of why the defendant remained ignorant, not on a
finding of knowledge. Logically, ignorance cannot be genuine knowl
edge.59 Deliberate ignorance is not genuine knowledge. Rather, delib
erate ignorance is something close to positive knowledge, without the
defendant's actually knowing the fact is certainly true.
Nevertheless, deliberate ignorance is the moral equivalent of
genuine knowledge.60 The Model Penal Code states that knowledge of
a fact is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its exis
tence, unless he actually believes it does not exist.61 Thus one can be
aware of a high probability that Fact X exists, but deliberately remain
ignorant of that fact, or one can be aware of a high probability that
Fact X exists, and actually know that it does. In both cases, the defen
dants are equally culpable because they were either aware of a high
probability of X, or knew X
both satisfy the Model Penal Code's
definition of knowledge.
The primary purpose of equating deliberate ignorance with knowl
edge, and of giving a jury instruction based on this equation, is to pre
vent a guilty defendant from escaping punishment by deliberately
avoiding knowledge of some key facts.62 The notion is that the defen
dant is in fact guilty, and his ability to determine the facts which he
should avoid confirming as true demonstrates that he did in fact pos
sess the required knowledge, or level of culpability to be guilty of
knowledge.63 The ostrich instruction "allows the jury to impute knowl
edge to (a defendant) of what should be obvious to him if it found, be
yond a reasonable doubt, a conscious purpose to avoid enlighten
ment."64 Finding deliberate ignorance could be said to require an
inquiry into the motive of the defendant. If the defendant intentionally
remained ignorant of Fact X because he was aware of a high probabil
ity that Fact X was true, then he is just as culpable as the defendant
-

ful ignorance is genuine knowledge or a substitute for knowledge. Either of these two views,
they argue, provides a basis to allow the willfully ignorant defendant to be held liable for
violating a statute that requires that he act knowingly, although only those who embrace the
"substitute for knowledge" interpretation need to provide a further reason to defend the
justice of their result. See id. at 42.
59. Id. at 52 ("A particular explanation of why a defendant remains ignorant might jus
tify treating him as though he had knowledge, but it cannot, through some mysterious al
chemy, convert ignorance into knowledge.").
·

60. See id. at 36.
61. See supra note 14.

62. See United States v. Rothrock, 806 F.2d 318, 323 (1st Cir. 1986); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02 commentary passim (1985).
63. See Chinni, supra note 31, at 49.
64. United States v. Zimmerman, 832 F.2d 454, 458 (9th Cir. 1987).
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who had genuine knowledge.65 The ignorance of the deliberately igno
rant defendant is deliberate precisely because he is all too aware of the
existence of the offense.66 As such, it would be unfair to allow one to
use deliberate ignorance as a defense when the motive for his deliber
ate ignorance was his awareness of the existence of the offense - the
high probability of its existence.
Not all commentators, however, agree with this proposition. Some
argue that deliberate ignorance is merely recklessness, explaining that
recklessness is conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk.67 Conscious disregard, they assert, requires that the actor actually
have recognized a particular risk; it applies to a conscious disregard of
the likelihood of any material element of a crime.68 Recklessness de
scribes a willingness to act in the face of a perceived probability of the
existence or creation of a particular fact.69
Knowledge, critics explain, is really an awareness of the existence
of a particular fact, not an awareness of a high probability of its exis
tence, as the Model Penal Code states.70 Thus knowledge requires an
awareness of the acUial, certain existence of a fact rather than recogni
tion of its probability.71 According to these critics, the difference be
tween knowledge and recklessness rests in the qualitative difference
between probability and certainty: recklessness describes recognition
of a probability, while knowledge requires certainty.72 These critics
object to equating deliberate ignorance with knowledge because in or
der to establish that the deliberately ignorant defendant was guilty of
knowledge, the prosecutor must establish that the defendant was cer
tain that a fact existed and deliberately avoided confirming it.73 This is
impossible, they argue, because the defendant cannot be certain of a
fact and be ignorant of it at the same time.74 On the other hand, if the
65. Husak & Callender, supra note 18, at 41.
66. Id. at 58.
67. See, e.g. , Robbins. supra note 4; see also GRANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF
CRIMINAL LAW 96 (2d ed. 1983) (stating that recklessness usually involves conscious and
unreasonably risk-taking, "either as to the possibility that a particular undesirable circum
stance exists or as to the possibility that some evil will come to pass").
68. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 comment 3, at 236 (1985).
69. See Robbins, supra note 4, at 221-22.
70. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7); Robbins, supra note 4, at 222.
71. See Robbins, supra note 4, at 222; see also G. WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL
LAW 124 (2d ed., 1983); Charlow, supra note 55.
72. See Robbins, supra note 4, at 222; see also Williams, supra note 71, at 125.
73. See Robbins, supra note 4, at 222. Robbins argues that the provision of the Model
Penal Code defining knowledge was designed to eliminate the defense of deliberate igno
rance, and that the high probability language in the Model Penal Code indicates reckless
ness.
74. See Robbins, supra note 4, at 222; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 comment 3,
at 236 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985); Charlow, supra note 55.
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defendant believed there was only a probability that the fact existed
and deliberately avoided confirming it, he is only guilty of reckless
ness, and not knowledge. In that case, they argue that deliberate igno
rance cannot be a substitute for knowledge, but only for recklessness.
Several significant differences between knowledge and reckless
ness weaken arguments that deliberate ignorance is a substitute for
recklessness and not knowledge. First, there is a difference in levels of
culpability regarding defendants who act with knowledge and defen
dants who act with recklessness. The deliberately ignorant defendant
is as culpable as the defendant who possesses positive knowledge, be
cause in both cases, there is at least an awareness of a high probability
of the existence of the fact. Critics are really attacking the "level " of
knowledge required by the defendant, arguing that unless defendants
know a fact to be true to a certainty, then they do not possess "knowl
edge." But deliberate ignorance is the perfect instance in which a de
fendant who does not possess actual knowledge but rather construc
tive knowledge is as culpable as the defendant who possesses actual
knowledge. The deliberately ignorant defendant remains deliberately
ignorant because he knows the fact is true, but does not want to con
firm its truth. As such, this defendant is as culpable as the defendant
who has actual knowledge. Thus the Model Penal Code's alternate
definition of knowledge, which only requires knowledge of a high
probability of the existence of a fact, accommodates specifically those
defendants who act with deliberate ignorance, and thus is appropriate.
Furthermore, recklessness involves assessing the social utility of
the conduct by balancing the justifiability of an act against the risk of
harm, while knowledge requires no such balancing.75 In other words,
to find recklessness, the jury must balance justifiability with risk and
harm. If the justifiability of the act is low, the defendant's necessary
awareness of the risk and harm of the act must also be low to complete
the balancing. The level of awareness for knowledge, on the other
hand, does not depend on the level of social utility or risk or harm, but
rather is an independent fact.76 That the defendant must be aware of a
high probability of the existence of a particular fact is always a specific
level of awareness, regardless of other factors involved. So a high de
gree of certainty determines knowledge, and establishing deliberate
ignorance is not impossible. It does not require establishing actual

75. WAYNE R. LEFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 3.5(f) at 239 (2d
ed. 1986). As one commentator explained:
Where the act in question has little or no social utility, recklessness may require a far lower
degree of awareness than does Section 2.02(7). Indeed, 'if there is no social utility in doing
what he is doing, one might be reckless though the chances of harm are something less than
one percent.' By contrast, 'high probability' entails well over a 51 percent chance of harm.
Marcus, supra note 14, at 2239-40.
76. See Marcus, supra note 14, at 2239.
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knowledge and ignorance at the same time, as some commentators
have asserted.77
In sum, a defendant is deliberately ignorant of Fact X if he believes
there is a high probability that X is true, be he decides not to investi
gate to determine whether X is true and has a conscious desire to re
main ignorant of whether Xis true in order to claim ignorance as a de
fense and escape liability.7s Because the defendant is aware of a high
probability that Fact X is true, the mental state present in the defen
dant is the moral equivalent of knowledge, but not positive knowledge
or certainty.79
B.

Potential Problems with Jury Confusion

Critics warn that without explaining the requirement of a specific
level of awareness, a jury can interpret deliberate ignorance to mean
that the defendant can be convicted because he should have known
the fact, instead of convicting the defendant because he was aware of
the high probability of the existence of the fact and deliberately chose
not to investigate in an effort to avoid liability. Thus, critics worry that
a jury will convict a defendant merely on a showing of recklessness or
negligence, rather than knowledge established by deliberate igno
rance. The jury should not punish the defendant, they warn, because
he deliberately avoided learning of a fact, but only because he knew
the fact, or was aware of the high probability of its existence.so The
culpable behavior was his knowledge, not his failure to investigate. In
addition, to convict the defendant because he should have known the
fact is to convict on a negligence standard. Convicting on a negligence
standard requires the jury to argue that a reasonable person would
have known the fact, and thus the defendant should have known the
fact.SI
These concerns about jury confusion are unwarranted and can be
overcome in two ways. First, even accepting the proposition that de
liberate ignorance and knowledge are equivalent mens reas, a precise
definition of deliberate ignorance would eliminate the risk of a jury's
confusing the mental states of deliberate ignorance and recklessness
and thus convicting on a lesser mens rea. This would address concerns
of opponents of the very concept of deliberate ignorance, who argue
juries should not receive deliberate ignorance instructions because
they could unwittingly employ a negligence standard, thereby con-

77. See id. at 225. See generally Charlow, supra note 55.
78. See Husak & Callender, supra note 18, at 41-42.
79. See id.
80. See Marcus, supra note 14, at 2247-48.
81. See id. at 2248.

November 2001]

Deliberate Ignorance in Conspiracy Cases

487

victing a defendant on the impermissible and inapplicable grounds
that he should have known an illegal act was taking place.82
Another potential solution to this dilemma, in an effort to protect
defendants, lies in the jury instructions, where the court must be spe
cific in its explanation of deliberate ignorance, and perhaps even con
trast it explicitly with negligence and recklessness. Unlike the negli
gent defendant, who is unaware of a proposition that a reasonable
person would have known to be true, the willfully ignorant defendant
is not totally oblivious to the truth of that proposition. Rather, the
willfully ignorant defendant is aware of a high probability of its exis
tence.83 Similarly, unlike the reckless defendant, who is aware of the
possibility of risk and disregards it, a defendant with knowledge does
not engage in any type of conscious disregard, but rather is aware of
high probability of a certain fact, well over the level of awareness nec
essary for recklessness.84 Explaining these differences to the jury could
alleviate any confusion.
In sum, courts can alleviate the concerns that juries' jobs are hard
enough without including a deliberate ignorance instruction with ease
in primarily two ways. First, courts must pinpoint a precise definition
of deliberate ignorance in an effort to provide more specificity with
respect to the mental state of the defendant; as a result, the jury will
be less likely to confuse the mental state of deliberate ignorance with
the mental state of recklessness. Secondly, a simple instruction clearly
outlining the differences between deliberate ignorance on one hand
and negligence and recklessness on the other should clear up any po
tential jury confusion as well.
�I.

FLAWS OF THE SECOND AND FIFTH CIRCUIT APPROACHES

The federal circuits take various approaches to the problem of de
liberate ignorance in conspiracy cases, but the current approaches are
flawed and fail to hold guilty defendants accountable. This Part ex
plains why neither the Second nor Fifth Circuits' approaches are satis
factory. Section II.A describes the Second Circuit's approach, the
strict compliance approach, and argues that it is too strict in its allow
ance of the use of deliberate ignorance in conspiracy cases. Section
11.B argues that the Fifth Circuit's logic approach is inadequate be
cause it is too lenient in its use of deliberate ignorance and ignores the
mens rea requirements of conspiracy and the correspondence princi
ple.

82. See K. O'MALLEY ET AL, FEDERAL JuRY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS:
CRIMINAL § 17.09 (5th ed. 2000); United States v. Beckett, 724 F.2d 855, 856 (9th Cir. 1984)
(per curiam).
83. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (1985).
84. See id.
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Second Circuit's Approach: A Strict Adherence to the
Correspondence Principle

The strict compliance approach to the ostrich instruction, while not
without merit, is too restrictive in its approach to deliberate ignorance.

The Second Circuit recognizes the two elements of conspiracy: (1)
knowledge of the unlawful goals of the conspiracy; and (2) intent to
further the goals of the conspiracy.85 The Second Circuit has approved
the use of deliberate ignorance to establish knowledge of the unlawful
goals of the conspiracy.86 Nonetheless, it argues that conscious avoid
ance does not support a finding of intent to further the goals of a con
spiracy, because intent requires a showing of knowledge and purpose,
and deliberate ignorance is sufficient only as to knowledge.87
In United States v. Lanza,88 the defendant was accused of conspir
acy to commit wire fraud. The defendant argued that while he was in
volved in the group's activities, he believed he was helping to commit
extortion, not wire fraud. The court reasoned that evidence in Lanza
indicated that there was no question regarding the defendant's intent
to further the goals of the conspiracy, as defendant admitted that
much. The issue was whether defendant had knowledge of the unlaw
ful goals of the conspiracy. The court ruled that a conscious avoidance
charge was appropriate vis-a-vis knowledge of the objectives of the
scheme.89
The Second Circuit enforced the Lanza ruling in United States v.
Ferranini, explaining further the conscious avoidance charge, and ex
pounding on the requirement that a factual predicate exist before the
instruction may be given.90 A factual predicate exists when the evi
dence is such that a rational juror may reach the conclusion beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of a high probability
of the fact in dispute and consciously avoided confirming the fact.91 It
permits a finding of knowledge even where there is no evidence that
the defendant possessed actual knowledge. The Ferranini court ex
plained that a conscious avoidance instruction permits a jury to find
that a defendant had culpable knowledge of a fact when the evidence
shows that the defendant intentionally avoided confirming the fact.92

85. United States v. Lanza, 790 F.2d 1015, 1022 (2d Cir. 1986).
86. See, e.g., id.
87. United States v. Eltatyib, 88 F.3d 157, 170 (2d Cir. 1996).
88. 790 F.2d at 1017.
89. Id. at 1023.
90. See United States v. Ferranini, 219 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2000); see also United States v.
Rodriguez, 983 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1993)
91. Rodriguez, 983 F.2d at 458.
92. Ferranini, 219 F.3d at 154.
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Like the Lanza court, the court in Ferranini reiterated that the con
scious avoidance instruction may be given only if the defendant asserts
the lack of some specific knowledge required for conviction. In sum,
the Second Circuit held that in cases where the defendant argues only
that he or she did not know of the conspiracy's unlawful goals, and not
that he or she did not intend to further the aims of the conspiracy, the
ostrich instruction is appropriate because only the defendant's knowl
edge, not purpose/intent, is at issue. And deliberate ignorance is suffi
cient to establish knowledge.
But to establish the second element - intent to further the goals
of the conspiracy - according to the strict compliance approach, evi
dence of both purpose and knowledge is necessary because the second
element requires specific intent. Specific intent is "knowingly doing an
act which the law forbids and purposely intending to violate the law."93
Conscious avoidance is relevant to the knowledge component of spe
cific intent, but a finding of conscious avoidance alone could not by it
self provide the basis for a finding of specific intent as a whole because
specific intent is comprised of knowledge and purpose.
Thus, according to the strict compliance approach, because the os
trich instruction equates deliberate ignorance with knowledge, an
offense that requires proof of no mental state beyond knowledge is an
appropriate avenue for the ostrich instruction. In other words, courts
should use a deliberate ignorance instruction only in connection with
crimes for which the required mental state is knowledge or some lesser
mens rea, but not for purpose.94 When the crime charged requires that
the prosecution prove that the defendant acted with specific intent, a
carelessly worded ostrich instruction may give the jury the impression
that the defendant's deliberate ignorance establishes not only guilty
knowledge but also purpose.95 The Second Circuit explains that the os
trich instruction confuses the two elements of conspiracy, collapsing
them into one. This confusion could deprive the defendant of a legiti
mate defense that the defendant knew of the illegal goals of the con
spiracy, but was not involved in the conspiracy in any way.96 Thus the
strict compliance approach does not allow an ostrich instruction when
the defendant claims he was not involved in the conspiracy.

93. See United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1 196 (2d Cir. 1989).
The Model Penal Code says a person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an
offense: "(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his con
scious object to engage in the conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and (ii) if the
element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circum
stances or he believes or hopes that they exist." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1985).
94. See Chinni, supra note 31, at 51 (1991).
95. See id. at 51.
96. See id. at 54.
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The strict compliance approach is not without merit. It is logical to
argue that a defendant must know of the conspiracy's unlawful goals
in order to manifest the intent to further these unlawful objectives.97 If
only the defendant's knowledge of the unlawful goals of the conspir
acy is established, the prosecution must still prove that the defendant
acted with the purpose of furthering the objectives of the conspiracy.98
If the defendant only asserts that he knew of the unlawful goals of the
conspiracy but had no connection with the conspiracy, the defendant's
knowledge of the existence of the conspiracy and its aims is merely
evidence that would discredit the defendant's defense.99 The defen
dant's knowledge makes it more likely that he was involved with and
intended to further the goals of the conspiracy.100 Supporters of the
Second Circuit's approach argue that such knowledge can buttress an
inference that the defendant must have been involved in some way
with the members of the conspiracy in order to acquire the knowledge,
but this knowledge is not equivalent to intent to further the aims of
the conspiracy. 1 01
This approach is much too restrictive in its allowance of an ostrich
instruction in conspiracy cases.102 Deliberate ignorance establishes
only knowledge according to this approach, and thus the Second Cir
cuit allows deliberate ignorance to prove only the element of conspir
acy that requires knowledge, and does not allow it to establish the
element that requires specific intent, and thus requires purpose.103
Strict compliance, however, focuses too narrowly on these mens rea
requirements. It protects a defendant's right to raise the defense of
noninvolvement: that he did not intend to further the goals of the con
spiracy, but it "undervalues the potential that a finding of deliberate
ignorance has for damaging the credibility of the defense of non
membership in a conspiracy."104

97. See id. at 53. Proof of a defendant's knowledge or deliberate ignorance does have
evidentiary value even if the prosecution must also prove that the defendant acted inten
tionally. If the prosecution shows that the defendant had knowledge (or the equivalent
thereof) of the conspiracy, it becomes more likely that the defendant was involved with the
conspiracy and intended to further it. Id. at 52 n.127.
98. See id. at 53.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 54 (citing United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538, 547 n.1 (2d Cir. 1984)).
102. See United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1989). The
Second Circuit allows for deliberate ignorance to establish the first element of conspiracy,
but not the second, because the second requires both purpose and knowledge, and deliber
ate ignorance is sufficient only as to knowledge.
103. Id.
104. Chinni, supra note 31, at 56-57.
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At the very least, this approach deprives the prosecution of the
opportunity to challenge the defendant's assertion that he was not a
member of a conspiracy.105 Evidence of deliberate ignorance regarding
knowledge of the conspiracy's obj ectives would damage the credibility
of a defendant who argued that he did not intend to further the goals
of the conspiracy, and thus argues that he was not a member of a con
spiracy. In order to avoid the risk that the jury would convict the de
fendant of conspiracy based only on evidence of his deliberate igno
rance, the Second Circuit forbids the use of a deliberate ignorance
instruction altogether when intent to further the goals of the conspir
acy (i.e. membership in a conspiracy) is at issue.106 In doing so, the
Second Circuit deprives the prosecution of the opportunity to allow
deliberate ignorance to damage the credibility of his defense of non
involvement.107 For instance, in United States v. Diaz, the defendant
argued that he had no connection with the conspiracy and was not a
member.108 The strict compliance approach would forbid the use of the
ostrich instruction, and proof of deliberate ignorance, because mem
bership is at issue. In cases like Diaz, proof of the defendant's knowl
edge of the unlawful goals of the conspiracy would tend to discredit
his defense that he was not involved in the conspiracy. Thus, by pre
venting the prosecution from introducing such evidence, the court de
nies it of a useful tool to discredit the defense of non-involvement.
Although this approach is consistent with the Model Penal Code,
the ostrich instruction is useful in those cases in which the defendant's
membership is at issue because the defendant's deliberate ignorance,
which is the equivalent of knowledge, makes it somewhat more likely
that he was involved in the conspiracy and intended to further its
aims.109 While deliberate ignorance in this context is insufficient to es
tablish positively the specific intent element of conspiracy - intent to
further the goals of the conspiracy - it might damage the credibility
of a defense that the defendant did not intend to further these goals.

105. See id. at 57.
106. See Mankani, 738 F.2d at 538. Defendants in Mankani were charged with conspir
acy to possess and distribute hashish. The DEA received notice of the conspiracy's drug
smuggling operation and began surveying the area, including aurally surveying a hotel room
where one defendant was staying. The defendant against which the deliberate ignorance in
struction was used was a tenant in the home located on property where some of the illegal
activity took place, although she seemed to have no direct involvement with the operation.
The government argued that the evidence established the defendant's participation in the
conspiracy or at least proved that she consciously avoided knowledge of the conspiracy. The
Second Circuit found that a conscious avoidance instruction was inappropriate because, it
argued, a person cannot consciously avoid participating in a conspiracy and be a member of
the conspiracy at the same time.
107. See Chinni, supra note 31, at 56-57.
108. 864 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1988).
109. See Chinni, supra note 31, at 61.
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In conclusion, the Second Circuit's approach, while strictly adher
ing to the mens rea requirements set forth for a conspiracy charge, is
too uncompromising in its blanket ban on the ostrich instruction in
cases in which membership in a conspiracy is at issue.
B.

Fifth Circuit's Approach: An Exercise of L ogical Reasoning

The Fifth Circuit's approach,110 on the other hand, does account for
the potential that a finding of deliberate ignorance has for damaging
the credibility of the defense of non-membership in a conspiracy. The
Fifth Circuit's approach, however, is much too lenient because it ig
nores mens rea requirements all together.
As used by the Fifth Circuit, the term "deliberate ignorance" de
notes a conscious effort to avoid positive knowledge of a fact that is an
element of an offense charged. In effect, the defendant chooses to re
main ignorant so he can plead lack of positive knowledge in the event
he should be caught.111 The Fifth Circuit maintains that an ostrich in
struction is properly given when: (1) the facts support an inference
that the defendant was subjectively aware of a high probability of ille
gal conduct, and (2) the facts support an inference that the defendant
purposely contrived to avoid learning of such conduct.112 Unlike the
Second Circuit, the Fifth Circuit tends not to distinguish between de
liberate ignorance with respect to the two elements of the conspiracy
charge. It allows the ostrich instruction to establish both knowledge of
the unlawful goals of the conspiracy and intent to further the goals of
that conspiracy.
The first prong of the Fifth Circuit's deliberate ignorance test pro
tects a defendant from being convicted for what he should have
known.113 The prosecution may not establish that a defendant had the
requisite guilty knowledge merely by demonstrating that a reasonable
person would have been aware of the illegal conduct.1 1 4 The jury may
not convict the defendant simply because he was foolish, stupid, or
negligent.1 1 5 The first prong permits a deliberate ignorance instruction
only when the prosecution presents facts that support an inference
that the particular defendant subjectively knew his act to be illegal. It

110. The Fifth Circuit's approach will also be referred to as the "logic approach."
111. See United States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d 946, 951 (5th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Restrepo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 1978).
1 12. Deborah Sprenger, Annotation, Propriety of Instruction of Jury on "Conscious
A voidance"' of Knowledge of Nature of Substance or Transaction in Prosecution for Posses
sion or Distribution of Drugs, 109 ALR FED. 710 (2001) (citing United States v. Fierro, 38
F.3d 761 (5th Cir. 1994)).
1 13. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d at 952.
1 14. Id.
1 15. Id.
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does not permit such an instruction when the prosecution presents
facts establishing that a reasonable person would have known the acts
to be illegal. In this way, the logic approach addresses the concern
previously discussed that the deliberate ignorance instruction runs the
risk that the jury will convict on a negligence standard, assessing in
stead what a reasonable person would have done in the defendant's
position.116
The court may only consider the second prong of the Fifth Cir
cuit's test if the prosecutor is able to establish the first prong. A de
fendant could not purposely avoid learning of illegal conduct unless he
was subjectively aware that a high probability of illegal conduct exists.
Nonetheless, the same evidence that will raise an inference that the
defendant had actual knowledge of the illegal conduct ordinarily will
raise the inference that the defendant was subjectively aware of a high
probability of illegal conduct. Thus, in many cases, the propriety of a
deliberate ignorance instruction depends upon evidence that the de
fendant purposely contrived to avoid learning of the illegal conduct the second prong of the logic approach's deliberate ignorance instruc
tion.117 Direct or circumstantial evidence may establish the defendant's
purposeful contrivance to avoid guilty knowledge.118 For instance,
courts have determined that a defendant's admission of an intent to
avoid incriminating knowledge establishes the defendant's purposeful
contrivance to avoid knowledge.119
The logic approach essentially equates deliberate ignorance with
knowledge, and then argues that purpose follows logically. In other
words, to the extent that the instruction is merely a way of allowing
the jury to conclude that the defendant knew of the unlawful purpose
of the conspiracy, it is hardly inconsistent with a finding that he in
tended to further the unlawful goals of the conspiracy with his overt
acts.120 The Fifth Circuit argues that if the defendant knew of the un
lawful goals of the conspiracy, it follows that he intended to further
the unlawful goals of the conspiracy if there is evidence of overt acts in
furtherance of the conspiracy.

1 16. See supra Section I.B.
1 17. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d at 952.
1 18.

Id.

1 19. See United States v. Peddle, 821 F.2d 1521, 1523-25 (11th Cir. 1987).
120. See United States v. Inv. Enters., Inc. , 10 F.3d 263, 269 (5th Cir. 1993). The defen
dant argued that he cannot be deliberately ignorant of the object of the conspiracy and also
intend to further its purpose as required by the conspiracy charge. The Fifth Circuit ex
plained that his argument overlooked the fundamental nature of the deliberate ignorance
instruction, which is to inform the jury that it may consider evidence of the defendant's cha
rade of ignorance as circumstantial proof of guilty knowledge. Id. (citing Lara-Velasquez,
919 F.2d at 951). Viewed this way, the deliberate ignorance instruction is a particularized
circumstantial evidence instruction.
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The logic approach is too lenient in that it ignores all the mens rea
requirements established by the Model Penal Code for conspiracy. On
the surface, this approach appears to argue that if there is evidence
that the defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning of the illegal
conduct, it follows that he held the specific intent necessary to be
guilty of intending to further the unlawful goals of the conspiracy.
However, in making this logic argument, the Fifth Circuit ignores the
mens rea requirements of conspiracy under the Model Penal Code. It
allows deliberate ignorance to establish knowledge of the unlawful
goals of the conspiracy, just as the Second Circuit does. The Fifth Cir
cuit then argues, however, that purpose is not a necessary element to
establish the second element of conspiracy because deliberate igno
rance is sufficient to establish this second element. Thus, the logic ap
proach does one of two things: it either changes the mens rea require
ments for the second prong of the conspiracy test from specific intent,
which would require both knowledge and purpose, or it equates delib
erate ignorance not only with knowledge, but also with purpose.
Regardless of which of the above two alternatives accurately de
scribes the approach taken by the Fifth Circuit, neither is consistent
with the intent of the Model Penal Code. First, the drafters of the
Model Penal Code intended a universal application of deliberate igno
rance, not one limited by the two-prong test instituted by the Fifth
Circuit. According to the Model Penal Code, "when the issue is
whether the defendant knew of the existence of a particular fact . . . it
is enough that the actor is aware of a high probability of its exis
tence. "1 21 No language in the · Code suggests that the definition apply
only in the limited circumstances where the evidence indicates a con
scious purpose to avoid the truth.122 The purposeful avoidance re
quirement does not add to the protection offered to the defendant
from some of the risks inherent in a deliberate ignorance instruction,
primarily because liability can be predicated on an omission to learn.123
The defendant does not have to close his eyes to be liable. He can be
convicted for failure to investigate. Under the logic approach, aware
ness of the risk plus omission to learn can establish the purposeful
avoidance element. This makes awareness of the risk alone sufficient
for guilt.124
Under the logic approach, the jury can infer not only knowledge,
but also purpose from a highly ambiguous omission. An examination
of the facts of some other Fifth Circuit cases shows that it is frequently

121. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) explanatory note (1985).
122. Marcus, supra note 14, at 2238-39.
123. Alan Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State, 71 S. CAL L. REV. 953, 988
(1998).
124. Id. at 989.
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impossible to conclude that the defendant's failure to investigate was
due to an affirmative desire or purpose to avoid learning the truth,
rather than to sheer indifference to learning the truth. 125 For instance,
in United States v. Investment Enterprises, Inc. , the court held that
there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendant
purposely contrived to avoid knowledge of the illegal conduct.126 As
evidence of this conclusion, the court pointed to various failures to act
on the part of the defendant. For example, although the illegal activity
was taking place across the street from the defendant's workplace, the
defendant only walked there twice in two years, often sending his sub
ordinates;127 the defendant never attended board meetings;128 and de
spite his membership on the board of the company at issue, defendant
did not involve himself in the sales, marketing or prices strategies of
the company.129 In sum, the jury concluded that the defendant pur
posely contrived to avoid knowledge based on a series of omissions, or
failures to act. In doing so, the jury convicted the defendant of a crime
requiring proof of both knowledge and purpose with evidence only of
knowledge at best, and purpose by omission.
Thus, the logic approach uses the deliberate ignorance instruction
much too leniently. It confuses purpose and knowledge and allows de
liberate ignorance to establish purpose. In doing so, the logic approach
disregards the mens rea requirements for conspiracy as established in
the Model Penal Code.
Ill. PROPOSAL FOR THE A DOPTION OF A VARIATION OF THE TENTH
CIRCUIT ' S APPROACH
This Part proposes alternative criteria for permitting a deliberate
ignorance instruction similar, but not identical, to that used by the
Tenth Circuit. It argues for an approach where the prosecution may
use deliberate ignorance to establish purpose in a conspiracy case if
the defendant has taken deliberate acts to avoid knowledge of his
125. See Lara- Velasquez, 919 F.2d 946 (deciding that the defendant's failure was not due
to an affirmative desire or purpose to avoid the truth where the defendant drove a truck con
taining drugs across the Mexico-U.S. border at the instruction of his cousin without ques
tioning these instructions or inspecting the truck, but with the knowledge that his uncle has a
poor reputation). But see. United States v. Inv. Enterprises, 10 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 1994)
(finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendants conspired to transport
obscene videos in interstate commerce, since the evidence undercut the defendant's position
that he had no actual knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the conspiracy and had no intent
to further it and was sufficient to prove not only that he knew of the unlawful purpose of the
conspiracy to ship obscene videos interstate, but also that he joined it with the intent to fur
ther it).
126. 10 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 1994).
127.

Id.

128.

Id.

129.

Id.

at 269.
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membership in a conspiracy (hereinafter, hybrid approach). By al
lowing a deliberate ignorance instruction when a defendant takes clear
and unequivocal steps to avoid knowledge, the Fifth Circuit limits the
prosecution's ability to establish purpose by omission, as it is almost
impossible and illogical to prove purpose by omission. Rather, the
prosecution would have the burden of proving purpose through com
mission, the defendant's taking purposeful steps to avoid knowledge.
Because there is some merit to both the strict compliance and logic
approaches - the former's adhering to the mens rea requirements
and the latter's argument that employs logic to allow deliberate igno
rance to prove purpose in conspiracy cases - but also some serious
flaws,130 the courts must adopt a standard that accounts for these con
siderations. A variation of the Tenth Circuit's approach would accom
plish this task.
Under the Code's conception of deliberate ignorance, evidence of
an actor's purpose to avoid the truth will be sparse, if not entirely ab
sent, because a decision not to investigate before participating in the
conspiracy will involve only an omission.131 The only evidence will
tend to establish the defendant's participation in the conspiracy:
1 ) evidence that the defendant engaged in a criminal act, and 2) evi
dence that he possessed a high level of awareness of a fact in ques
tion.132 The evidence will not distinguish between whether the defen
dant intended to avoid knowledge of the fact, did not care enough to
investigate, or knew of the fact.133 For instance, examine the classic ex
ample of deliberate ignorance. Someone asks defendant to carry a
suitcase across the U.S./Mexico border and pays defendant a large
sum of money for doing so. Stopped at customs, the defendant must
display the contents of his suitcase, and officials find drugs in his pos
session. The defendant claimed he believed he was carrying only
clothing across the border. It is almost an impossible task for the
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
"formed a conscious purpose to avoid the truth"134 but with the ostrich
instruction and the Model Penal Code's modified definition of knowl
edge to include awareness of the high probability that the fact in ques
tion is true, the prosecution does not have to bear such a burden. To
establish knowledge or the equivalent thereof, and hence deliberate
ignorance, the prosecution need only prove that the defendant pos-

130. See supra Part II.
131. See Marcus, supra note 14, at 2237 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 9).
132. See id. at 2237-38.
133. See id. at 2238. Marcus goes on to explain that the point of MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(7) is that this ambiguity does not matter as long as the evidence indicates that the de
fendant was aware of a high probability that the fact existed.
134. Id.
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sessed a high level of awareness of a fact in question, but it has no
burden to establish why the defendant had no actual knowledge of the
fact in question.
The Tenth Circuit sought to restrict the deliberate ignorance doc
trine to the rare case that presents evidence of deliberate and une
quivocal acts to avoid learning the truth.1 35 The Tenth Circuit ruled in
United States v. Francisco-Lopez that courts cannot give a deliberate
ignorance instruction unless there is sufficient evidence pointing to
acts by the defendant to avoid knowledge.1 36 A deliberate ignorance
instruction is appropriate, the court explained, when a defendant de
nies knowledge of an operant fact and the evidence, direct or circum
stantial, shows that the defendant engaged in deliberate acts to avoid
actual knowledge of that operant fact.1 37 In other words, the district
court may tender a deliberate ignorance instruction when the govern
ment presents evidence that the defendant purposefully contrived to
avoid learning all of the facts in order to have a defense in the event of
prosecution.U8 An example of such deliberate or unequivocal acts
would be if a defendant were sitting in a room with his co
conspirators, and they began to discuss the success and goals of the
conspiracy, and defendant stood up and walked out of the room. This
evidence would tend to indicate that defendant was purposely trying
to avoid knowledge of the conspiracy - that he was purposely trying
to remain ignorant, but was aware of a high probability of its exis
tence. The facts of the case would have to support the inference that
defendant knew he was involved in a conspiracy, yet intentionally
closed his eyes to that fact.
This requirement of deliberate and unequivocal acts is excessive
given that the prosecution is attempting to use deliberate ignorance to
establish only knowledge. Court have generally accepted the proposi
tion that knowledge and deliberate ignorance are equally culpable.1 39
Because knowledge can include acknowledgement of a high probabil
ity that the fact in question is true, the Model Penal Code guidelines

135. See United States v. Galindo-Torres, No. 91-2020, 1992 WL 14921 (10th Cir. Jan 30,
1992); see also United States v. Francisco-Lopez, 939 F.2d 1405 (10th Cir. 1991); Marcus,
supra note 14, at 2251 .
136. 939 F.2d a t 141 1 . I n this case, the defendant was stopped b y a highway police offi
cer during a drive from Los Angeles to New York City. One of the officers noticed that the
rear door vent of the car was held in place by pop rivets rather than the factory-installed
screws. After the defendant consented to a search of the car, the police officer determined
that there were hidden compartments in the car's frame containing drugs. Defendant was
arrested and fifteen kilograms of cocaine were extracted. The defendant denied knowing
that the drugs were in the car. The prosecution's case was comprised of inferences arising
from the unusual circumstances under which the defendant came to possess the cocaine.
137. See Marcus, supra note 14, at 2251.
138. See id. at 2252.
139. See supra Part I.
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do not warrant the requirement that the defendant engage in specific
acts to avoid positive knowledge of the unlawful goals of the conspir
acy in order to establish the knowledge element alone.
Requiring proof of unequivocal acts, however, it is not an excessive
burden if the prosecution is attempting to establish the specific intent
element of the conspiracy charge. According to the hybrid approach,
omission is sufficient to establish deliberate ignorance with respect to
knowing participation in a conspiracy, while commission is necessary
and sufficient to establish deliberate ignorance with respect to intent
to further the goals of the conspiracy. Under the hybrid approach, the
court would require evidence of deliberate and unequivocal acts to
avoid actual knowledge to capitalize on the merit of the logic ap
proach taken by the Fifth Circuit,1 40 thereby allowing the prosecution
to establish the specific intent required by the second element of a
conspiracy charge by satisfying both parts of the conspiracy charge
with deliberate ignorance. In reality, under the hybrid approach, the
prosecution is only directly establishing the first element of conspiracy
via deliberate ignorance, and inferring the second. In other words, the
issue is whether the prosecution establishes knowledge of the unlawful
goals of the conspiracy with evidence of commission or omission. If
the prosecution relies on evidence of the defendant's failure to act, as
the court did in United States v. Francisco-Lopez,141 then deliberate ig
norance is only sufficient to establish knowledge, and hence the first
element of the conspiracy charge.
Under the hybrid approach, suppose the prosecution relies on
unequivocal acts taken by the defendant that indicate that he inten
tionally avoided knowledge of these facts but was practically certain
they were true. In that case, the prosecution can use deliberate igno
rance to establish not only knowledge, but also purpose, hence prov
ing the specific intent element of conspiracy. The jury uses the vehicle
of the Fifth Circuit's logic argument to arrive at establishment of this
second element of conspiracy. If the defendant had knowledge of the
unlawful goals of the conspiracy, established by evidence of deliberate
ignorance proven by commission, and assuming evidence of an overt
act in furtherance of the conspiracy, then the defendant must have in
tended to further the goals of the conspiracy. Although no language in
the Model Penal Code indicates that the definition of deliberate igno
rance apply only in limited circumstances where the evidence indicates
a conscious purpose to avoid the truth,142 adopting this narrow defini
tion would allow courts to use deliberate ignorance to establish the
140. See supra Section Il.B.
141. 939 F.2d. at 1405.
142. See Marcus, supra note 14, at 2238-39. Marcus goes on to point out that the Second
and Ninth Circuits have nonetheless, rather than viewing § 2.02(7) as a standard definition of
knowledge of a fact, applied it as a limited deliberate ignorance alternative.
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"purpose" element of conspiracy - intent to further the goals of the
conspiracy.
Critics may argue that, according to this approach, the prosecution
need only establish that the defendant knew of the unlawful goals of
the conspiracy, and without any further effort by the prosecution, the
jury is free to infer that the defendant must have intended to further
the goals of the conspiracy, assuming evidence of an overt act. As the
logic approach advocates, however, if the prosecutor can prove that
the defendant had knowledge of the unlawful goals of the conspiracy,
and that he took overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, it follows
that he intended to further the goals of the conspiracy.143 If the defen
dant took deliberate acts purposely to avoid learning of the conspir
acy, but continued to participate in the conspiracy, then by the tradi
tional implementation of a deliberate ignorance theory, the
prosecution can prove that the defendant knew he was in a conspir
acy.144 By continuing to participate and taking deliberate steps to avoid
obtaining certain knowledge,145 the prosecution can prove that the de
fendant purposefully furthered the goals of the conspiracy. The hybrid
approach uses not deliberate ignorance per se, but rather a variation
of the mens rea of purpose, just like deliberate ignorance itself is a
variation of the mens rea of knowledge.
The hybrid approach also accounts for previously raised concerns
regarding the jury's confusion of knowledge and negligence. Recall
from Part I that critics are concerned that unless a court explains the
requirement of a specific level of awareness, a jury can interpret delib
erate ignorance to mean that it can convict the defendant because he
should have known the fact, instead of convicting the defendant be
cause he was aware of the high probability of the existence of the fact
and deliberately chose not to investigate in an effort to avoid liability.
Thus, critics worry that a jury will convict a defendant merely on a
showing of recklessness or negligence, rather than knowledge estab
lished by deliberate ignorance.146 To convict the defendant because he
should have known the fact is to convict on a negligence standard, be
cause the jury would be arguing that a reasonable person would have
known the fact, and thus the defendant should have known the fact.147
143. See United States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d 946, 951 (5th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Restrepo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524, 527-28 (5th Cir. 1978).
144. See supra Section 11.B.
145. See, e.g., United States v. Galindo-Torres, No. 91-2020, 1992 WL 14921 (10th Cir.
Jan. 30, 1992); Francisco-Lopez, 939 F.2d at 1405.
146. KEVIN O'MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS:
CRIMINAL § 17.09 (5th ed. 2000); see also United States v. Beckett, 724 F.2d 855, 856 (9th
Cir. 1984) (per curiam); supra Section LB.
147. As Marcus argues:
The idea that a defendant is culpable because she avoided knowledge suggests the defendant
had a duty to obtain that knowledge; the notion of conscious avoidance improperly targets
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Under the hybrid approach, however, the jury cannot convict a defen
dant with evidence of failure to act when the law requires evidence of
purpose because the law would require evidence of unequivocal acts to
use deliberate ignorance to establish purpose.148 It would no longer be
sufficient to rely on a defendant's failure to act to establish purpose, as
the Fifth Circuit logic argument proposes. Rather, evidence of com
mission would ensure that juries do not convict a defendant for failing
to act when the prosecution must establish a specific intent to further
the goals of the conspiracy. Negligence and recklessness are often
proven by failure to act when one should have,149 but by forcing the
prosecution to establish purpose by commission, there is a minimal
risk that the jury will confuse the specific intent necessary to prove
conspiracy with negligence.
Furthermore, the hybrid approach addresses the previously raised
concern that refusing a deliberate ignorance instruction with respect to
the second element of a conspiracy charge deprives the prosecution of
the opportunity to challenge the defendant's assertion that he was not
a member of a conspiracy.150 As previously stated, a defendant's delib
erate ignorance and the inference of knowledge that it supports can
cast doubt on his claim that he was not involved in the conspiracy. 151
Evidence of deliberate ignorance regarding knowledge of the conspir
acy's objectives would damage the credibility of a defendant who ar
gued that he did not intend to further the goals of the conspiracy, and
thus argued that he was not a member of a conspiracy. In order to
avoid the risk that the jury would convict the defendant of conspiracy
based only on evidence of his deliberate ignorance, the Second Circuit
has opted to forbid the use of a deliberate ignorance instruction alto
gether in those cases in which intent to further the goals of the con
spiracy is at issue.152 In doing so, the Second Circuit deprives the
prosecution of the opportunity to allow deliberate ignorance to dam
age the credibility of his defense of non-involvement.153

the defendant"s alleged failure to investigate as the culpable aspect of her conduct. The
Model Penal Code, however, protects against conviction under a negligence standard by
supplying a general definition of knowledge, which requires a finding that the defendant
possessed a high level of awareness of the critical fact.
Marcus, supra note 14, at 2248.
148. It is important to note here that the knowledge element of conspiracy can still be
established with evidence of omission. Establishing "knowledge" as defined by deliberate
ignorance requires no special proof of positive, unequivocal acts to avoid actual knowledge.
149. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1985).
150. See supra, Section II.A; see also Chinni, supra note 31, at 57.
151. See supra Section II.A.
152. See United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1984).
153. See Chinni, supra note 31, at 56-57.
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The hybrid approach considers this tool of the prosecution and al
lows a deliberate ignorance instruction even when only the defen
dant's intent to further the goals of the conspiracy is at issue - an in
struction the Second Circuit currently forbids under its approach. By
adopting the hybrid approach, the concern that the jury would convict
the defendant of conspiracy based only on evidence of his deliberate
ignorance is no longer legitimate, because the prosecutor is not denied
this opportunity to challenge the defendant's membership in a con
spiracy. It takes into consideration the idea that deliberate ignorance,
especially if established by the defendant's action rather than failure
to act, makes it more likely that he or she was involved in the conspir
acy and intended to further its aims. And deliberate ignorance evi
denced by positive acts would be sufficient to establish the defendant's
guilt if used to establish that he intended to further the goals of the
conspiracy - in other words, if used to establish his membership in
the conspiracy.
CONCLUSION
None of the current approaches to a deliberate ignorance instruc
tion in conspiracy cases is satisfactory. The strict compliance approach
is too strict in its allowance of the use of deliberate ignorance in con
spiracy cases. This approach ignores some of the merits of the logic
approach, and it strips the prosecution of the opportunity to address
the likelihood that the defendant intended to further the goals of the
conspiracy as evidenced by his deliberately remaining ignorant of cer
tain facts pertaining to the conspiracy. On the other hand, the logic
approach is too lenient in its use of deliberate ignorance, and it ignores
the mens rea requirements of conspiracy and the correspondence
principle. A hybrid of the strict compliance and logic approaches that
adheres to the mens rea requirements while taking into account the
Fifth Circuit's logic argument is a better approach. Courts should
adopt an approach similar to the one adopted by the Tenth Circuit
that allows the jury to use deliberate ignorance to establish purpose if
there is evidence that the defendant has taken purposeful, deliberate
acts to avoid knowledge. This way, the prosecution may use deliberate
ignorance to establish purpose in a conspiracy case if the defendant
has taken deliberate acts to avoid knowledge of his membership in a
conspiracy. By allowing a deliberate ignorance instruction only in the
case where a defendant has taken clear and unequivocal steps to avoid
knowledge, the prosecution will have the burden of proving purpose
through commission, the defendant's taking purposeful steps to avoid
knowledge.

